Abstract: Sophie de Grouchy published Letters on Sympathy in 1798 with her translation of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). While seemingly a commentary on Smith's work, scholars have come to see Letters on Sympathy as a standalone treatise on the nature of sympathy and its place in morality. Grouchy develops her own unique, compelling account of morals and politics based in sympathy. In addition, she aims to convince her audience to seek a better way of living, and by doing so help "bring us back to ourselves, and make us dwell inside our souls" (58). In this way, Letters on Sympathy is also a practical work, one that sketches a view of the good life and articulates the steps to attaining this life.

Notably, Grouchy identifies boredom as a chief obstacle to virtue and happiness. She refers to boredom as "the cruelest of sicknesses that can afflict the human heart" (74-75). Yet, boredom is also endemic to the human condition. After all, what human being has escaped the grasp of boredom? According to Grouchy, we become susceptible to boredom as soon as our basic physical needs are met (74). At this point, we are drawn to new experiences that "move us" and distract us from "habitual impressions" we now find too "painful and insipid" (75). People become unable to enjoy whatever goods we possess and find ourselves "attracted only to that which they do not have," which she notes makes them "greedy and insatiable concerning those objects" that elude them (74). In this way, for Grouchy, we seem condemned to live in "the throes of discontent" (Ibid.). We are then left with the following tension: avoiding discontent is key to a good life but boredom seems inescapable. To live well this tension must be resolved.

I argue that Grouchy's solution to the problem of boredom lies in proper moral education. I begin this paper by discussing what Grouchy sees as the problem of boredom. She identifies two forms of boredom, the first of which typically results from a desire to attain a more advantageous position, the second of which proceeds from intellectual laziness or malaise (152). I then consider how, according to Grouchy's view, boredom motivates us to live outside ourselves, making it impossible for us to enjoy our own company, the enjoyment of which is necessary for both virtue and happiness according to her. From here, I discuss Grouchy's views on moral education, the role it plays in our development, and how it might help solve the problem that boredom poses. I end by examining Grouchy's claim that the wisest life is one spent in one's own company. I argue that in praising such a life she fails to appreciate the value of boredom, perhaps even its virtue, and in doing so threatens to misconstrue the role plays moral education in helping us be virtuous and happy.