Abstract:

This paper examines the concept of curiosity in the work of Gabrielle Suchon, highlighting its central role within her theories of knowledge and human nature and its implications for her feminism. Although Suchon is often recognized as an important figure in the history of feminism, her epistemology and philosophical anthropology have only recently begun to receive sustained scholarly attention. Drawing primarily on Part II of Suchon’s 1693 Traité de la morale et de la politique, which offers an extended argument for women’s entitlement to pursue knowledge, I argue for the centrality of curiosity to Suchon’s system and emphasize the originality of her account within its early modern context. For Suchon, curiosity is the central passion that initiates and sustains the pursuit of truth and enables our cooperation with divine grace in the effort to repair our fallen condition.

I begin by analyzing Suchon’s account of the nature of curiosity. For Suchon, curiosity is a natural and necessary passion within a teleological conception of the human person. It orients the mind toward forms of knowledge that contribute to human perfection, namely, knowledge of ourselves, the world, and ultimately God. In a notable departure from the theological traditions of Augustine and Aquinas, who condemn curiosity as a vice and consequence of the Fall (Conf. X.35; ST II–II, q. 167), Suchon reconstrues curiosity in positive terms while retaining the notion that it is symptomatic of our fallenness. She characterizes curiosity as a “natural concupiscence,” akin to hunger or thirst, and defines it as the “first stage of knowledge,” insofar as it initiates and sustains the pursuit of truth (TMP II.XI.138–139). Curiosity is thus neither a sin nor a vice but a morally and intellectually advantageous emotion that assists fallen human beings in repairing their nature.

Next, I explore the implications of Suchon’s account of curiosity for her feminism. Suchon rejects traditional gendered associations of “dangerous” or “excessive” curiosity with women and with Eve as the paradigmatic case. By framing curiosity as a natural concupiscence, she presents it as an ungendered passion that is equally necessary and appropriate in both sexes. Beyond this defense of women’s curiosity, Suchon exposes the motives behind efforts to denigrate it and oppose its cultivation. She argues that the conventional reasons men give for curbing women’s curiosity—such as moral protection and the safeguarding of truth—function as pretexts for preserving intellectual and social dominance and maintaining women’s ignorance.

Finally, I highlight the distinctive character of Suchon’s account within its early modern context, comparing it with negative depictions of women’s curiosity by Fénelon and Malebranche and positive ones by Poulain. For Suchon, the pursuit of knowledge has reparative significance: it is the means by which human beings cooperate with divine grace to repair the intellectual damage caused by original sin (TMP II.II.5–9). Curiosity is the passion that initiates and sustains this essentially human task. Though a feature of our fallen condition, curiosity is the passion that best enables its repair.