Abstract: It is sometimes thought that Hume's philosophy of science is, let's just say, inadequate to the demands placed on it by even the sciences of his time. Closer examination, however, of some of the arguments behind such thoughts reveals a different picture. What is being deemed inadequate is either or both of, depending on the case, Hume's practice of science or his commitment to good principles of science. The talk is in two parts. The first comprises a negative point, that such arguments are, even if correct, not relevant as analysis of Hume's philosophy of science. Schliesser is a sufficient stalking horse for this and his discussion attributing to Hume disingenuousness on the one hand, and mathematical incompetence on the other, will be the focus of the negative part. The second part is more positive. I reconstruct Hume's argument in the first part of the Treatise as undermining a particular foundation for Early Modern science, and laying out a different foundation more solid and more broad. This is what I will call a methodological skeptico-idealism: the main point of the sciences, on this view, is to provide understanding. It does so by the production of localized, proximal causes for phenomena in contradistinction to metaphysically profligate and unknowable un-perceivable "explanatory" entities. I will take the time to lay to rest any worries that Hume eschews causes or at least our knowledge of their efficacy in part by a canvas of his rules for attributing causes. Of particular interest will be a construction that bridges the negative and positive parts: a Humean account of universal gravitation in terms of such causes.