Abstract: Francis Hutcheson is thought of as an optimist about human nature. On this interpretation, he rejects the egoism that dominates Protestant natural law theory and Calvinist theology. He emphasizes benevolence and human sociability, and he argues that our emotions can be well regulated by rational emendation of the beliefs or "opinions" on which they rest (e.g., Gill 2006: 135–197). Such an interpretation is largely correct. But it overlooks the darker, or more pessimistic, elements in his work Hutcheson's work. As a result, the optimistic reading is too simplistic.

The aim of this paper is to examine that pessimistic strain by investigating Hutcheson's theory of emotion regulation. The first part of the paper looks at the details of his theory. Hutcheson's view of association is more Lockean than Humean. Like Locke, he believes the associative process tends to produce "foolish" and "fantastick" (outlandish and "unnatural") results. These betray the workings of an unruly mind. Such ideas are disconnected from reality — ranging from the merely false to the irrational and even mad. Moreover, they give rise to affections and passions which are agitating and disagreeable, and which lead to behavior which is self-destructive, imprudent, or immoral. Such states of mind result from unconscious non-rational processes, and they are not easily amended by rational reflection and belief-correction. Therefore, they present significant problems for emotion regulation. Hutcheson writes insightfully about these problems, and his account of emotion regulation suggests several techniques for solving them. I examine these techniques and explain how they depart from his main account of emotion regulation, which is quite optimistic about the power of the intellect to regulation emotion by correcting their underlying beliefs. When we look at the association of ideas, we see that his faith in reason's power to effectively regulate emotion is more limited than it often appears.

The second part of the paper zooms out to reflect on Hutcheson's appreciation for the limits of reason and the strain of pessimism in his moral philosophy. Here I argue that this side of his work is continuous with the early modern—and typically Christian, even Augustinian—Cultura Animi tradition described by Sorana Corneau (Corneau 2011; cf. Ahnert 2014). We're apt to overlook this continuity if we focus only on his famous refutations of egoism or his sentimentalist theory of moral judgment. Highlighting this continuity with the Cultura Animi tradition makes it easier to see why Hutcheson thinks of moral philosophy as "the art of regulating the whole of life" (Hutcheson 2007: 23). Furthermore, it restores emotion regulation and self-cultivation, sometimes by non-cognitive means, to its rightful place in his work.